MONROVIA – Since the fall of 2023, political commentator Ambulah Mamey has been relentless: “Liberia passed MCC scorecards every year from 2015 until 2019, then under Weah the country failed every year until 2023, now that Weah is gone, we are passing again (2024, 2025, 2026).” It is clear: Liberians will never make that Weah mistake.” This is a potent, politically charged narrative, but how well does it hold up against the facts? A close dive into MCC scorecard data, independent analysis, and Liberian media suggests his broad outline has merit, though the full picture is more complex.
To begin, it’s worth clarifying what “passing the MCC scorecard” means. The Millennium Challenge Corporation uses 20 third-party indicators to assess countries on governance, economic freedom, and investing in people. More than simply tallying up scores, MCC requires: (1) passing at least 10 out of the 20 indicators, (2) passing the Control of Corruption indicator, and (3) passing either Political Rights or Civil Liberties (“hard hurdles”). So “pass/fail” is not just symbolic, it’s tied to very specific thresholds.
Mamey’s central claim is chronological: strong performance pre-2019, a collapse during Weah’s presidency, and a rebound after his exit. According to public MCC documents, that roughly aligns with the data. For example, in the FY 23 scorecard, Liberia passed the Control of Corruption, Political Rights, and other key indicators. By contrast, in earlier years under Weah there were indeed years when the country struggled.
Looking at FY 22, the MCC scorebook shows significant weaknesses: for instance, Liberia’s Regulatory Quality score was quite low, and Government Effectiveness lagged. Those are not trivial indicators; regulatory quality and effectiveness affect how well policy decisions turn into real-world results.
Mamey’s framing of “failing every year until 2023” captures public frustration, but strictly speaking, not all “failures” are absolute. Some years, while certain indicators fell short, Liberia may have still met the overall pass threshold, or been close. The composite nature of the scorecard means that slippage in some domains does not necessarily translate into total collapse, though it weakens the case for compact eligibility.
By FY 24, Liberia passed 14 out of 20 indicators, a solid rebound. On that year’s scorecard, Liberia scored 59% on Control of Corruption, 51% on Fiscal Policy, and did very well (93%) on Freedom of Information. Civil society, especially CENTAL (Center for Transparency and Accountability in Liberia), praised the result but also cautioned that paper gains must translate into real institutional change.
Mamey’s narrative would be further vindicated if the rebound continued, and according to recent MCC data, it apparently has. For FY 25, MCC formally invited Liberia “to develop a compact,” citing improved scorecard performance. For FY 26, Liberia passed 12 out of 22 indicators, according to reporting from AllAfrica. That suggests a sustained recovery, not just a one-off uptick.
But it would be a mistake to interpret this as full vindication of Mamey’s politics without nuance. First, passing 12 out of 22 in FY 26 means that several critical indicators are still being missed. According to the report, Liberia failed in Civil Liberties, Government Effectiveness, Primary Education Expenditure, Natural Resource Protection, Regulatory Quality, and a few others. These are deep structural issues, not just cosmetic reforms.
Second, anti-corruption remains central. Even though the Control of Corruption indicator has improved, civil society groups like CENTAL continue to warn that impunity is rampant. Passing the Control of Corruption hurdle is required for MCC eligibility, but it doesn’t guarantee prosecution, reform, or a real culture change.
Third, there are persistent gaps in “Investing in People.” In a November 2025 opinion piece, public health expert Tolbert G. Nyenswah highlighted the Child Health indicator as deeply troubling: Liberia’s scores have hovered around 33–37% in recent years, reflecting weak health infrastructure, poor service delivery, and underfunding. That’s a sobering reminder: even as governance scores improve, human capital development remains fragile.
Fourth, Mamey’s line, “Liberians will never make that Weah mistake,” is strongly political and holds normative weight, but MCC scorecard performance is not the only or final metric of national success. Infrastructure, long-term development, political stability, and institutional capacity matter, too.
Still, his framing has rhetorical power because it ties accountability (MCC failure) to electoral consequences. Many Liberians heard his message because it crystallizes frustration with the Weah years: for Mamey, the compact scorecard is not just technical, it’s proof of governance failure.
And that narrative has resonance: U.S. voices did raise alarm during the Weah regime. For example, former U.S. Ambassador to Liberia Michael McCarthy publicly urged Liberia to take “concrete steps” in fighting corruption after a repeated scorecard failure, calling governance deficits “low-hanging fruit” for reform.
Yet other voices offered different interpretations. Some commentators under the Weah presidency pointed to improvements in macroeconomic policy or infrastructure, arguing that incremental reforms were underway. The New Republic Liberia, for instance, highlighted that Liberia scored 51% in Fiscal Policy, 76% in Inflation, and 59% in Control of Corruption, framing these as successes under Weah’s leadership. That narrative clashes with Mamey’s more damning line, but both draw on the same scorecard data.
So, is Mamey right? In large strokes, yes: there was a decline in MCC performance around the middle of Weah’s administration, and there is a measurable rebound since his exit. His claim captures a real and consequential trend. But the details matter, because the scorecard itself is not a binary “good vs bad” gauge. It is granular and multi-dimensional.
Moreover, the structural and institutional challenges that cropped up under Weah, including weak regulatory quality, poor civil service effectiveness, and low social investment, are not solved simply by passing a few more indicators. The FY 26 scorecard shows improvement, but also shows continuing gaps.
Looking forward, the real test for the current government headed by President Joseph N. Boakai will be sustaining and deepening reforms, not just for MCC optics, but for real governance change. Passing the MCC scorecard is meaningful because it can unlock future compacts (which bring large investments), but real transformation requires embedding accountability, strengthening institutions, and improving service delivery.
Mamey’s rhetoric, “Liberians will never make that Weah mistake,” may rally voters, but what the MCC scorecards are showing is that recovery is possible, not guaranteed. The rebound since 2023 is impressive, yet fragile.
If the Boakai adminstration leverages its recent momentum wisely, it could secure more MCC support (a second compact) and build stronger institutions. But failure to address the deeper weaknesses, especially in people-centered indicators like education and health, could stall or reverse hard-won gains.
In the final analysis, Mamey’s claim works as a powerful political narrative because it’s grounded in real MCC data and taps into public discontent. But for Liberia’s long-term development, the work must go beyond passing scorecards toward systemic transformation.
For Liberians watching closely, the message is both hopeful and cautionary: yes, things are improving, but history doesn’t guarantee a one-way trajectory. The past can teach powerful lessons, but the future depends on sustained reform, not just rhetoric.
