Did the LPRA bypass the competitive bidding process? The 2019 Petroleum Law, presidential approval and the shadows of Liberia’s past oil scandals
MONROVIA, LIBERIA — Liberia’s latest attempt to attract international petroleum investors has opened a potentially consequential legal and governance question: Did the Liberia Petroleum Regulatory Authority (LPRA) follow the requirements of the country’s amended petroleum law when it launched a direct-negotiation licensing round for 15 offshore oil blocks in Cape Town, South Africa?
The question is not merely whether Liberia should attract more investors. It is whether the government is following the legal procedures established to protect the country’s petroleum resources from arbitrary decisions, questionable concessions and arrangements that could leave the Liberian people shortchanged.
On October 14, 2026, the LPRA launched its 2026 Offshore Direct Negotiation Licensing Round during African Energy Week in Cape Town, offering 15 offshore blocks across the Liberia and Harper basins. The regulator invited prospective investors to submit expressions of interest before the announced April 15, 2027 deadline.
But an examination of Liberia’s 2019 Amended Petroleum Law raises a critical question: What specific legal authority, presidential approval and prequalification arrangements underpin the decision to use direct negotiations for these blocks instead of international competitive bidding?
The issue is particularly sensitive because Liberia’s petroleum sector has previously been rocked by allegations of bribery, disputed concession procedures and questions about political influence during the administration of former President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.
Those controversies do not establish that the current LPRA leadership has committed wrongdoing. But they make strict compliance with the law, public disclosure and independent scrutiny essential.
At the centre of this investigation is Section 14.1 of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Reform Law, as amended in 2019, which identifies three methods of awarding petroleum agreements: international open competitive bidding, direct negotiations and executive allocation to the National Oil Company of Liberia (NOCAL).
The law recognises direct negotiations, but it does not simply give the regulator an unrestricted choice to use that method in every circumstance.
The central question is whether the LPRA has complied with the specific conditions attached to the direct-negotiation pathway it selected.
THE LAW: DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ARE PERMITTED IN SPECIAL CASES
The 2019 amendment provides a framework that distinguishes international competitive bidding from direct negotiations.
Section 14.1(a) provides for petroleum agreements to be awarded through international competitive bidding in accordance with Sections 15 through 17 of the principal law.
Section 14.1(b)(i), meanwhile, states that the Authority may grant petroleum rights through direct negotiations in special cases, giving ultra-deepwater blocks as an example. It adds that presidential approval is required for such blocks and that separate prequalification guidelines must apply.
Section 14.1(b)(ii) further provides that no company may be approved for direct negotiation or the tender process unless it undergoes prequalification and is found technically and financially capable of operating the allocated block, either independently or with capable partners.
The amendment also states that production-sharing or other agreements resulting from direct negotiations or tenders must be submitted to the Legislature for ratification.
These provisions are contained in the official 2019 amended law published through the LPRA’s legal resources and reproduced in the FAO’s legal database.
The legal implications are significant.
The statute recognises direct negotiation as an available method, but the provision concerning special cases attaches specific requirements to that route.
That raises several questions the LPRA should answer publicly:
– Did the President approve the use of direct negotiations for the relevant blocks before the process commenced?
– What criteria were used to determine that the blocks qualified as special cases under Section 14.1(b)(i)?
– Were separate prequalification guidelines established for the direct-negotiation process?
– Were those guidelines approved and published or otherwise made available in accordance with the applicable law and procedures?
– How were companies assessed for technical capacity, financial strength and relevant offshore experience?
– What legal analysis supports the use of direct negotiations for all 15 blocks under the same licensing round?
These are not peripheral administrative matters. They go directly to the legal basis on which petroleum rights are being offered.
If the LPRA cannot demonstrate compliance with the applicable statutory requirements, the legality of the process would warrant further examination by the relevant oversight institutions and, if necessary, the courts.
However, the publication of a direct-negotiation round does not alone prove that the law has been violated. The required approvals and guidelines may exist without having been adequately explained to the public.
That is precisely why the regulator should disclose the relevant records.
THE CRUCIAL QUESTION: WHERE IS THE PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL?
The 2019 amendment expressly refers to presidential approval for direct negotiations in special cases, including ultra-deepwater blocks.
The LPRA’s October announcement presents the 15-block round as a direct-negotiation initiative. Its public materials describe the available acreage as covering deepwater and ultra-deepwater opportunities across the Liberia and Harper basins.
That description makes the question of presidential approval particularly important.
Did President Joseph Nyuma Boakai issue a formal approval authorising the use of direct negotiations for the blocks covered by the round?
If so, when was the approval issued, which blocks did it cover and what legal and technical reasons were provided?
Was the decision supported by an assessment showing why direct negotiations were appropriate for the specific acreage?
Did the approval identify the special circumstances that justified departing from a conventional competitive bidding process?
The public deserves answers supported by documents rather than general assurances that the government is committed to attracting investors.
A presidential statement supporting offshore investment is not necessarily the same thing as the formal approval contemplated by the statute. The two should not be confused without examining the actual records.
The LPRA should publish the approval or identify where it can be accessed, subject to any lawful restrictions.
If no such approval was required because the regulator relies on a different legal interpretation of the amended law, that interpretation should also be made public.
The objective is not to presume a violation. It is to establish whether the statutory requirements were satisfied.
WERE SEPARATE PREQUALIFICATION GUIDELINES ESTABLISHED?
The second major legal question concerns prequalification.
The amended law does not merely require companies to express interest in offshore acreage. It requires applicants to demonstrate that they possess the technical and financial capacity to undertake petroleum operations.
For special-case direct negotiations under Section 14.1(b)(i), the law specifically refers to separate prequalification guidelines.
The public should therefore be able to establish whether the LPRA adopted guidelines applicable to this particular round, what standards those guidelines contain and how they were applied.
The regulator should clarify whether the guidelines establish requirements for:
– Financial resources sufficient to fund the proposed exploration programme.
– Proven technical expertise and relevant offshore operating experience.
– Access to the equipment, personnel and partners necessary for deepwater exploration.
– Disclosure of beneficial ownership and relevant politically exposed persons.
– Verification of corporate records and the financial standing of applicants.
– The assessment of potential conflicts of interest.
– The process for selecting companies to enter block-specific negotiations.
The LPRA has previously published prequalification materials for petroleum-sector applicants, including requirements addressing technical and financial capacity. But the existence of general prequalification documents does not, by itself, establish whether the separate guidelines contemplated by Section 14.1(b)(i) were adopted and applied to this particular round.
The regulator should explain the relationship between its general requirements and the separate guidelines required for the special-case pathway.
It should also state how many companies have completed prequalification, how many remain under review and whether any company has been permitted to proceed to negotiations without satisfying all applicable requirements.
The public should not be asked to rely solely on a promotional announcement that qualified investors are welcome to participate.
The regulator should be able to demonstrate how qualification is determined and how the law is being applied.
WHY WAS COMPETITIVE BIDDING NOT USED?
The choice between competitive bidding and direct negotiations is central to the public-interest question.
Competitive bidding allows the government to establish published criteria and compare proposals from qualified companies. Depending on the bidding design, the process can help assess exploration commitments, technical expertise, financial capacity and the economic terms offered to the state.
Direct negotiations can also be used in petroleum licensing, particularly where the law permits special arrangements. But they place considerable importance on the government’s ability to explain why the method was selected and how the resulting terms protect the national interest.
Liberia’s National Petroleum Policy states that petroleum awards should be based on a transparent competitive bidding process aimed at securing the best returns for the country and attracting qualified partners.
It further states that direct negotiations should be allowed where a competitive process has failed to attract bids yielding sufficient returns for Liberia. The policy also calls for the reasons for resorting to direct negotiations to be made public before negotiations begin.
This policy language raises a further question about the 2026 round.
Did the LPRA previously offer these blocks through a competitive process? If so, what were the results?
If a competitive process did not attract satisfactory bids, what evidence supports that conclusion?
If the LPRA relies instead on the special-case provision of the amended law, how does it interpret that provision alongside the National Petroleum Policy, and what documents support its interpretation?
The regulator should not leave this legal relationship unexplained.
It is possible for the amended statute and the policy to address different aspects of the licensing process. Determining how they interact requires examining the exact statutory language, the policy, any applicable regulations and the administrative decisions made for this round.
But that legal analysis should be conducted openly enough for the public to understand the basis of the decision.
The question is not whether direct negotiations are always illegal. The question is whether the LPRA has demonstrated that the particular process it launched complies with the law and the conditions governing its use.
LIBERIA’S OIL HISTORY PROVIDES A WARNING
Liberia has already experienced the consequences of controversial natural-resource transactions.
In February 2012, ProPublica published an investigation into allegations of bribery connected to earlier offshore oil concessions. The report examined findings attributed to Liberia’s General Auditing Commission concerning payments allegedly made in 2006 and 2007 to secure legislative approval of concessions involving Oranto Petroleum and Broadway Consolidated.
ProPublica reported that the alleged payments totalled less than US$120,000 and described how the concessions became connected to transactions involving major international oil companies, including Chevron. It also reported that the Auditor General had recommended nullifying contracts associated with the alleged payments.
These were serious allegations and audit-related concerns about the integrity of petroleum transactions. They should not be presented as proof that every company or official associated with the subsequent transactions committed a crime.
The controversy nevertheless raised a fundamental governance question: how could Liberia ensure that decisions involving valuable petroleum rights were made according to transparent procedures rather than through arrangements that the public could not adequately scrutinise?
The issue extended beyond the petroleum sector.
In May 2013, The Guardian reported on an audit of 68 natural-resource contracts worth approximately US$8 billion. According to the report, only two contracts were found to be fully compliant with the applicable requirements examined by the auditors. The review covered oil, mining, forestry and agriculture.
The findings prompted questions about compliance, documentation and the procedures used to allocate natural resources. The government’s response disputed interpretations that treated procedural problems as proof of corruption, but the audit findings reinforced the need for stronger oversight.
These historical episodes are relevant because Liberia’s petroleum resources are too important to be managed through procedures that cannot withstand public and independent scrutiny.
The lesson is not that the Boakai administration must be guilty of repeating the past. It is that the current administration has a responsibility to demonstrate that the safeguards governing the sector are being followed.
THE ROBERT SIRLEAF CONTROVERSY AND THE NEED FOR CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST SAFEGUARDS
The Sirleaf administration also faced controversy over the role of Robert Sirleaf, the former president’s son, who served as chairman of NOCAL’s board.
His position drew public scrutiny because of his family connection to the president and his role in an institution involved in the management of Liberia’s petroleum sector.
The broader controversy raised questions about the relationship between public office, family connections and decisions involving national resources.
The significance for the present investigation is institutional rather than personal.
The current licensing round should be governed by clear procedures for disclosing beneficial ownership, identifying politically exposed persons, managing conflicts of interest and documenting contacts between public officials and prospective investors.
The public should know which officials are responsible for recommending applicants, approving negotiations, reviewing contractual terms and ensuring compliance with the law.
Where relevant, the LPRA should explain how conflicts are identified and managed and what independent checks are applied to the process.
There is no evidence presented here that the Robert Sirleaf controversy establishes misconduct in the current licensing round. Nor does the history of the previous administration establish that present officials have acted improperly.
But Liberia has already learned that public confidence can be damaged when decisions involving national resources are insufficiently transparent.
The current government has an opportunity to demonstrate that the lessons of the past have been taken seriously.
FIFTEEN BLOCKS, BUT HOW MUCH TRANSPARENCY?
The LPRA’s Cape Town launch offered 15 blocks: 12 in the Liberia Basin and three in the Harper Basin.
The event was intended to attract companies interested in exploring Liberia’s offshore petroleum potential. The regulator has promoted the availability of seismic data and the prospect of further exploration.
However, an international launch does not establish that investors have committed money, signed agreements or begun exploration.
As of October 28, publicly available reporting confirms that the round was launched and that prospective companies have until April 15, 2027, to submit expressions of interest. The material reviewed for this investigation does not establish the number of companies that have formally expressed interest since the launch, which blocks they are pursuing or whether new binding investment commitments have resulted directly from the event.
That uncertainty should not be treated as proof of concealment. The licensing process remains open, and some information may legitimately be commercially confidential.
Nevertheless, the LPRA can provide a meaningful update without disclosing protected commercial information.
It can publish the legal basis for the round, the status of prequalification, the criteria for selecting companies, the relevant approval records and the expected procedural milestones.
It can also explain whether negotiations have begun for any blocks and distinguish expressions of interest from formal applications, qualified applicants and signed agreements.
These are basic accountability measures for a process involving national resources.
WHAT THE LPRA MUST ANSWER
The regulator should issue a comprehensive public explanation addressing the following questions:
1. Presidential approval: Did the President formally approve the use of direct negotiations for the 15 blocks under the special-case provision of Section 14.1(b)(i)? If so, when was the approval granted, and which blocks did it cover?
2. Special-case classification: What technical or legal criteria were used to determine that the relevant blocks qualified for direct negotiations under the amended law?
3. Separate prequalification guidelines: Were separate guidelines established for this round? When were they adopted, what requirements do they contain, and where can the public examine them?
4. Competitive bidding: Was competitive bidding attempted for any of the 15 blocks before the direct-negotiation round was announced? If so, what were the results?
5. National Petroleum Policy: How does the LPRA reconcile its decision with the policy’s provisions concerning competitive bidding and the conditions for direct negotiations?
6. Investor qualification: How many companies have completed prequalification, and what procedures are used to verify their technical and financial capacity?
7. Investor interest: How many companies have formally expressed interest in individual blocks since the Cape Town launch, and what stages of the process have they reached?
8. Financial commitments: Have any binding financial or exploration commitments been secured as a result of the round? If so, what commitments have been made, and which have actually become contractually binding?
9. Conflicts of interest: What safeguards are in place to identify beneficial owners and manage potential conflicts involving public officials, politically exposed persons, intermediaries and prospective investors?
10. Legislative oversight: How will the LPRA ensure that any resulting petroleum agreements are submitted to the Legislature for ratification as required by the amended law?
These questions should be put formally to the LPRA Director General, Marilyn T. Logan, the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning and the Office of the President.
Their responses should be published in full or fairly summarised alongside the findings of the investigation.
President Joseph Nyuma Boakai publicly endorsed the licensing initiative and pledged government support for attracting petroleum investors.
The administration now faces a responsibility to demonstrate that the pursuit of investment is consistent with legal compliance, public accountability and the protection of Liberia’s interests.
The government should not measure success solely by the number of blocks advertised, the number of companies attending an international conference or the publicity generated by a roadshow.
It should also demonstrate that the allocation process is lawful, that applicants are properly qualified, that the terms negotiated protect the state and that the public can scrutinise the decisions being made.
A clear public explanation would protect the LPRA as well as the government. If the required approvals and guidelines exist and the process complies with the law, disclosure would help establish that fact.
If there are deficiencies, early scrutiny would allow the relevant institutions to examine and address them before agreements proceed further.
Neither outcome is served by silence or uncertainty.
DID THE LPRA FOLLOW THE LAW, AND WILL IT SHOW THE EVIDENCE?
Liberia’s history of controversy surrounding petroleum concessions makes scrutiny of the 2026 licensing round both necessary and legitimate.
The 2019 Amended Petroleum Law recognises direct negotiations as one method of awarding petroleum rights. But Section 14.1(b)(i) expressly refers to special cases, such as ultra-deepwater blocks, and requires presidential approval and separate prequalification guidelines for those cases. The law also requires prequalification based on technical and financial capacity and provides for legislative ratification of resulting agreements.
The public therefore deserves to know how the LPRA applied those provisions when it launched the 15-block round in South Africa.
At this stage, the available evidence does not establish that the regulator has violated the law or concealed wrongdoing. Nor does the launch announcement alone demonstrate that every statutory condition has been satisfied.
That is precisely why the relevant documents, approvals and guidelines must be made available for scrutiny.
The LPRA must answer a simple but consequential question: What is the legal basis for using direct negotiations for these 15 offshore blocks, and where is the evidence that every applicable requirement of the 2019 Amended Petroleum Law has been met?
The people of Liberia should not have to guess whether their natural resources are being managed according to the law.
The burden is on the responsible institutions to demonstrate compliance through documents, transparent procedures and credible explanations.
Liberia needs investment. But investment cannot come at the expense of legality, accountability or the public interest.
The oil blocks belong to Liberia. The process for allocating them must stand up to the law—and to the scrutiny of the Liberian people.
